Procedural justice and the hedonic principle: How approach versus avoidance motivation influences the psychology of voice by Prooijen, J.W. van et al.
Procedural Justice and the Hedonic Principle: How Approach Versus
Avoidance Motivation Influences the Psychology of Voice
Jan-Willem van Prooijen
Free University Amsterdam
Johan C. Karremans
Radboud University Nijmegen
Ilja van Beest
Leiden University
The authors investigate the relation between the hedonic principle (people’s motivations to approach
pleasure and to avoid pain) and procedural justice. They explore whether approach or avoidance
motivation increases the effect that people feel they were treated more fairly following procedures that
do versus do not allow them an opportunity to voice their opinion. Experiments 1 and 2 reveal that these
procedures influence procedural justice judgments more strongly when people conduct approach motor
action (arm flexion) than when they conduct avoidance motor action (arm extension). Experiment 3
indicates that individual-difference measures of participants’ approach motivations predicted procedural
justice judgments following voice versus no-voice procedures. The authors conclude that people’s
motivational orientations stimulate their fairness-based reactions to voice procedures.
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Social justice is a key issue in understanding human behavior:
People are influenced profoundly by the extent to which they
perceive social situations as fair or unfair. For example, people
display signs of appreciation when they believe that justice has
been done, but acts of injustice lead people to show aversive
reactions, such as feelings of anger, fear, and disgust (Folger &
Cropanzano, 1998; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). It
has even been suggested that social justice may be one of the most
important norms and values in human society (Folger, 1984). A
conceptualization of social justice that has been extensively stud-
ied by social psychologists is the extent to which people perceive
decision-making procedures as fair, a conceptualization commonly
referred to as procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Pro-
cedural justice has been found to influence a wide range of
people’s perceptions and behaviors in various social situations (for
overviews, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano, Byrne,
Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind &
Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den
Bos & Lind, 2002; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2004b).
An illustration of a typical procedural justice phenomenon is the
finding that people evaluate decision-making procedures that al-
low them an opportunity to voice their opinions to be more fair
than procedures that do not allow them such an opportunity. This
finding is referred to as the voice effect (Folger, 1977). Besides
having a strong influence on procedural justice judgments, voice
procedures have been found to exert positive effects on many of
people’s other perceptions and behaviors. For example, voice
procedures (when compared with no-voice procedures) have been
found to increase positive affect, decrease negative affect, increase
people’s willingness to accept decisions, improve relations with
authorities, and improve task performance (Folger, Rosenfield,
Grove, & Corkran, 1979; see also Brockner et al., 1998; Greenberg
& Folger, 1983; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Tyler & Lind,
1992; Van den Bos, 2001, 2003; Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, &
Vermunt, 1998; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002,
2004a, 2005). People’s more positive responses to the granting as
opposed to the denial of voice have been described as one of the
most robust findings in procedural justice literature, and evidence
for these voice effects has been found in both applied and exper-
imental settings (e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Lind et al., 1990;
Tyler, 1987; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001).
In many social situations, voice versus no-voice procedures
precede decisions about positive outcomes (i.e., gains). In corre-
spondence with this, a substantial number of procedural justice
studies have investigated the voice effect in a gain-framed context.
For example, recipients in numerous empirical procedural justice
studies received voice or no-voice procedures about decisions
regarding pay distributions (Folger, 1977; Van den Bos, 1999; Van
den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van Prooijen et al., 2004a), lottery
tickets (Van den Bos, 2001, 2003; Van den Bos et al., 1997, 1998;
Van Prooijen et al., 2005), student grades (Tyler, Rasinski, &
Spodick, 1985; Study 2), or goal-setting opportunities (Lind et al.,
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1990; Van Prooijen et al., 2004a). As a consequence, influential
procedural justice theories are to a substantial extent based on
gain-framed social situations (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler &
Lind, 1992). Although we wish to emphasize that procedural
justice phenomena are important in loss-framed situations as well
(e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), these
considerations suggest that gain-framed situations provide a good
point of departure to study voice effects.
Our focus on gains was partially inspired by early instrumental
explanations of why people attach importance to voice procedures.
These instrumental explanations were based on research findings
that people prefer procedures that allow them a substantial amount
of process control, that is, control over the manner in which
decisions are made (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). According to in-
strumental explanations, one of the main reasons people desire
process control is “because it enables them to obtain predictable
and satisfactory outcomes” (Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut,
1978, p. 16). As such, instrumental explanations suggest that
people value voice procedures because they associate such proce-
dures with obtaining positive outcomes.
Besides instrumental explanations, in the 1980s procedural jus-
tice research indicated that people also value voice procedures for
noninstrumental reasons (e.g., Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1987; Tyler
et al., 1985). These noninstrumental concerns are highlighted in
the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992), which
asserts that people value voice procedures because such proce-
dures have positive implications for their sense of self-worth. More
specifically, voice procedures are usually provided by group au-
thorities, and these group authorities are generally perceived as
representative for the entire group. An authority that uses fair
procedures therefore communicates that recipients are respected
members of their community and that they are included in social
groups. Unfair procedures, however, communicate that recipients
are disrespected by their community and that they are excluded
from social groups (Lind, 2001; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1987,
1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van Prooijen et al., 2004a, 2004b). The
relational model thus proposes that people attach importance to
voice procedures because they associate such procedures with
obtaining important relational benefits, such as being respected
and included in valuable social groups.
Both instrumental and noninstrumental explanations of voice
effects have contributed in important ways to scientists’ under-
standing of when people feel treated fairly or unfairly by decision-
making authorities. Yet in the current article we suggest that both
perspectives offer an incomplete account of the motivational na-
ture of the voice effect: Do people value voice procedures because
these procedures increase their chances of obtaining important
instrumental or relational benefits, such as positive outcomes or a
sense of inclusion (i.e., approach motivated)? Or do people value
voice procedures because these procedures imply the avoidance of
detrimental instrumental or relational issues, such as being denied
valuable outcomes or being excluded from social groups (i.e.,
avoidance motivated)? Although the described theoretical perspec-
tives seem to assume the first possibility, empirical research has
ignored the question of whether voice effects are explained by
approach or avoidance motivation. As a consequence, it is as yet
unclear why people are motivated to have voice in a decision-
making process, which constitutes a void in scientific knowledge
on procedural justice. In the current research, we focus on the
question of whether the voice effect is driven by people’s approach
or avoidance motivations. As such, the current research is designed
to make a novel contribution to the procedural justice field by
investigating the underlying motivational principles that explain
people’s fairness-based reactions to voice and no-voice proce-
dures, thus specifying and extending existing procedural justice
theories. To explore the motivational nature of the voice effect, we
empirically tested the theoretical assumption that in a gain-framed
context, the voice effect is driven by people’s approach motiva-
tions, and we contrasted this proposition with the alternative pos-
sibility that the voice effect is driven by people’s avoidance
motivations.
The Current Research
People’s motivations to approach pleasure and to avoid pain are
commonly referred to as the hedonic principle (Fo¨rster, Higgins, &
Idson, 1998; Higgins, 1997). Although the hedonic principle has
been ignored by empirical procedural justice research, it is central
in other domains in social psychology. It has even been proposed
that “the distinction between approach and avoidance motivation is
fundamental and integral to the study of affect, cognition, and
behavior” (Elliot & Thrash, 2002, p. 804). To investigate how the
hedonic principle influences the voice effect, we base our line of
reasoning on the idea that people’s motivational state stimulates
their sensitivity to congruent social information (Higgins, 1997,
2000). To illuminate this point, it is likely that people who are in
an avoidance motivational state are particularly sensitive to cues in
their social environment that they associate with the avoidance of
undesirable issues. As a consequence, people respond positively
when they are successful in avoiding negative stimuli and respond
negatively when they are unable to avoid negative stimuli. A
similar process is likely to occur among people who are in an
approach motivational state: People who are in such a state are
particularly sensitive to cues in their social environment that they
associate with the acquisition of desirable issues. As a conse-
quence, people respond positively when they obtain desired ben-
efits and respond negatively when they are denied these benefits.
Thus, approach and avoidance motivation may direct people’s
attention to different types of social information.
This causal influence of approach and avoidance motivation on
the type of information that people focus on has implications for
how people respond to decision-making procedures. In correspon-
dence with previous theorizing, we propose that people associate
voice procedures with the acquisition of instrumental and rela-
tional benefits (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975;
Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). It therefore stands to
reason that especially those people who are in an approach moti-
vational state will pay attention to the extent to which they regard
these decision-making procedures as fair or unfair. As a conse-
quence, approach motivation is likely to stimulate people’s fair-
ness evaluations following voice and no-voice procedures. Ac-
cording to this line of reasoning, it would be expected that people’s
procedural justice judgments are particularly sensitive to the grant-
ing versus denial of voice when they are in an approach motiva-
tional state, as compared with when they are in an avoidance
motivational state. The alternative possibility, however, is that
people associate voice procedures with the avoidance of undesir-
able issues (e.g., being denied valuable outcomes, being excluded
687PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE HEDONIC PRINCIPLE
from social groups). If this were the case, then it would be
predicted that avoidance motivation stimulates people’s fairness
evaluations following voice and no-voice procedures. According
to this alternative line of reasoning, it would be expected that
people’s procedural justice judgments are particularly sensitive to
the granting versus denial of voice when they are in an avoidance
motivational state as opposed to an approach motivational state.
In the current research, we tested these opposing ideas in a series
of three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested our
hypotheses by means of orthogonal manipulations of approach
versus avoidance motor action. Furthermore, in Experiment 1 we
manipulated voice versus no-voice procedures in a scenario,
whereas in Experiment 2 participants directly experienced varia-
tions in voice versus no-voice procedures. In Experiment 3, we
extended our research by measuring people’s approach and avoid-
ance motivations as chronic individual-difference measures, fol-
lowed by a direct manipulation of voice versus no-voice proce-
dures. The main dependent variables in all three experiments were
judgments that are typically assessed in procedural justice re-
search: participants’ procedural justice judgments—that is, items
referring to the extent to which participants believed that they were
fairly treated by decision-making authorities (Lind & Tyler, 1988;
Tyler & Lind, 1992).
Experiment 1
How can people’s approach and avoidance motivations be ma-
nipulated in an experimental setting? Previous research has indi-
cated that people’s approach versus avoidance motivations are
reflected in their automatic social–physiological behaviors, such as
their motor actions (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Fo¨rster, 2003;
Fo¨rster & Strack, 1996). For example, Chen and Bargh (1999)
found that it is easier for people to pull positive items toward the
body, whereas it is easier for people to push negative items away
from the body. The arm movement of pulling items toward the
body (“approach”) is referred to as arm flexion; the arm movement
of pushing items away from the body (“avoidance”) is referred to
as arm extension.
When induced as an independent variable, arm flexion and
extension produce bodily feedback that activates people’s ap-
proach and avoidance motivational orientations outside of their
conscious awareness (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993;
Fo¨rster, 2003; Friedman & Fo¨rster, 2000, 2002; Priester, Ca-
cioppo, & Petty, 1996). According to Cacioppo et al. (1993), the
reason for this can be found in classical conditioning principles:
During one’s lifetime, muscle stimulations produced by arm flex-
ion are most closely associated with the consumption or acquisi-
tion of desired stimuli (approach), whereas muscle stimulations
produced by arm extension are most closely coupled with with-
drawal or rejection of undesired stimuli (avoidance). On the basis
of this line of reasoning, Cacioppo and his colleagues had partic-
ipants either place their hand below a table and press upward (arm
flexion) or place their hand on top of a table and press downward
(arm extension). The results revealed that participants evaluated
Chinese ideographs more positively in the arm flexion condition
than in the arm extension condition. Furthermore, the motor action
manipulation was cognitively associated with participants’ moti-
vational orientations (approach vs. avoidance), not with their emo-
tional orientations (pleasant vs. unpleasant). Moreover, empirical
data of six experiments ruled out alternative explanations, such as
self-perception and demand characteristics. The research by Ca-
cioppo and his colleagues is important because it indicated that
nonaffective bodily feedback, as produced by arm flexion versus
extension, can produce approach versus avoidance motivations
that shape attitude development (see also Priester et al., 1996).
The line of reasoning laid out in this article leads us to expect
that contractions of the flexion versus extension muscles influence
people’s justice-based reactions to voice versus no-voice proce-
dures. After all, if people value opportunities to voice their opin-
ions predominantly because they associate such procedures with
the acquisition of instrumental or relational benefits, then they
should be particularly sensitive to the granting versus denial of
voice when they are in an approach motivational state (as produced
by arm flexion) as compared with when they are in an avoidance
motivational state (as produced by arm extension). On the basis of
this line of reasoning, it can be predicted that people’s procedural
justice judgments are influenced more strongly by voice as op-
posed to no-voice procedures when they flex their arms than when
they extend their arms. Alternatively, if people value opportunities
to voice their opinions predominantly because they associate such
procedures with the avoidance of undesirable instrumental or
relational issues, then they should be particularly sensitive to the
granting versus denial of voice when they are in an avoidance
motivational state (as produced by arm extension) as compared
with when they are in an approach motivational state (as produced
by arm flexion). The alternative prediction would then be that
people’s procedural justice judgments are influenced more
strongly by voice as opposed to no-voice procedures when they
extend their arms than when they flex their arms.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were assigned randomly to con-
ditions of a 2 (motor action: arm flexion vs. arm extension) 2 (procedure:
voice vs. no-voice) factorial design. A total of 82 participants (31 men and
51 women, varying in age from 17 to 48 years) were recruited in the
restaurant of the Free University Amsterdam. The experiment was pre-
ceded by other, unrelated studies. The studies lasted a total of 45 min.
Participants engaged voluntarily in all of the experiments and were paid 5
euros (U.S.$6.25).
Procedure. Upon entry in the laboratory, participants were led to
separate individual cubicles. In the cubicles, participants found computer
equipment, which was used to present the stimulus information and to
register the data. The experiment was introduced as a study on how people
respond to social situations if they simultaneously exert a slight physical
effort. We then manipulated motor action: Participants in the arm flexion
condition were asked to put the palm of one of their hands under the table
and press upward, whereas participants in the arm extension condition were
asked to put the palm of one of their hands on the table and press
downward. Participants in both conditions were then asked to maintain a
slight pressure against the table during the entire experiment and to work
through the stimulus information with their one free hand using the
computer mouse and keyboard.
Participants were then presented with the following situation:
Imagine that you have had a summer job in a company. The company
has made good business in recent times. Because of a number of
financial windfalls, the management has decided to give every em-
ployee a once-only financial bonus. These bonuses will be divided by
every employee’s direct supervisor. Thus, your personal supervisor
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during your summer job will decide what financial bonus you will
receive.
We then manipulated procedure:
Your direct supervisor gives you [voice/no voice] about what bonus
you think that you should receive. Eventually, your supervisor decides
to give you a bonus of 50 euros.
After this, participants were asked to answer questions that pertained to
the dependent variables. To measure procedural justice, we asked the
following three questions: “How fair was the way you were treated by your
supervisor?” (1  very unfair, 7  very fair), “How just was the way you
were treated by your supervisor?” (1  very unjust, 7  very just), and
“How appropriate was the way you were treated by your supervisor?” (1
very inappropriate, 7  very appropriate). These three items were aver-
aged into a reliable procedural justice scale (  .94). We then asked
participants how annoying and how physically strenuous it was to press
their hand against the table, and how much physical effort it took to press
their hand against the table (1  not at all, 7  very much). Finally, we
asked participants to indicate how they were pressing their hand against the
table (1  pressing upward, 2  pressing downward, 3  not pressing)
and whether they used their left or right hand to press the table. After this,
participants were told that they could stop exerting pressure against the
table. Participants were fully debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results
A total of 5 participants indicated that they were not pressing
their hand against the table in the correct way during the experi-
ment. These participants were deleted from further analyses. Of
the remaining 77 participants, 76 indicated that they had used their
left hand to press against the table. One male participant indicated
that he had used his right hand to press the table, and this partic-
ipant was included in the analyses (results were similar when this
participant was excluded). Unless noted explicitly, participants’
gender did not show significant effects on the variables analyzed
below and was excluded as a factor in the reported analyses.
Physical discomfort. A 2 2 multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) did not show any significant effects on either the
multivariate or univariate level on the questions concerning how
annoying and how physically strenuous it was for participants to
press their hand against the table, and how much physical effort it
took (for annoyance, overall M  4.48, SD  1.83; for strenuous-
ness, overall M  3.71, SD  1.61; for physical effort, overall
M  3.26, SD  2.70). When included in the analyses, gender
showed a significant univariate main effect on strenuousness, F(1,
69) 6.46, p .02. Women found it more strenuous to press their
hand against the table (M 4.06, SD 1.58) than men (M 3.14,
SD  1.55). However, this main effect was independent from the
experimental conditions and was nonsignificant on the multivari-
ate level. More important, these results confirmed that participants
in the various conditions did not differ significantly in their re-
ported physical discomfort as a result of their motor action. Phys-
ical discomfort produced by motor action therefore cannot explain
the results presented here.
Procedural justice judgments. The means and standard devi-
ations of participants’ procedural justice judgments are displayed
in Table 1. A 2  2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on procedural
justice judgments revealed a significant main effect of procedure,
F(1, 73) 22.00, p .001. More important, the results yielded the
predicted interaction, F(1, 73) 6.39, p .02. Simple main effect
analyses indicated that the procedure manipulation exerted a sig-
nificant effect on procedural justice judgments in the arm flexion
condition, F(1, 73) 25.73, p .001, but not in the arm extension
condition, F(1, 73)  2.32, p  .13. These results corroborate the
hypothesis that participants are more strongly influenced by voice
procedures if they conduct approach motor action (arm flexion)
than if they conduct avoidance motor action (arm extension).
Further, the motor action simple main effect was significant in
the voice condition, F(1, 73)  6.27, p  .02, but nonsignificant
in the no-voice condition, F(1, 73)  1.23, ns. Although approach
motivation can elicit both positive and negative responses (i.e., by
obtaining vs. not obtaining positive stimuli; Higgins, 1997), in the
current experiment approach motor action stimulated participants’
positive responses to voice procedures, not their negative re-
sponses to no-voice procedures. We revisit this finding in the
General Discussion.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that participants’ proce-
dural justice judgments were influenced more strongly by voice as
opposed to no-voice procedures when they flexed their arms than
when they extended their arms. This suggests that participants who
conducted approach motor action were more sensitive to the pro-
cedure manipulation than participants who conducted avoidance
motor action. In correspondence with our analysis of previous
procedural justice research, the findings obtained in Experiment 1
support the idea that people’s fairness-based responses to voice as
opposed to no-voice procedures are primarily driven by their
approach motivations.
Before drawing strong conclusions, it is important to replicate
and extend these results. After all, in Experiment 1 participants
responded to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures in a hypo-
thetical situation. From the results of Experiment 1 alone, we do
not know how arm flexion and extension influence people’s pro-
cedural justice judgments and satisfaction ratings if they directly
experience variations in voice procedures. We therefore tested our
hypotheses again in an experiment in which participants directly
experienced a voice or a no-voice procedure.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we tried to replicate and extend the findings of
Experiment 1. In this experiment we made a number of modifica-
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Procedural
Justice Judgments as a Function of Motor Action and Procedure
(Experiment 1)
Procedure
Motor action
Arm flexion Arm extension
M SD M SD
Voice 5.91 0.86 4.75 1.54
No-voice 3.68 1.40 4.09 1.47
Note. Higher means indicate more positive procedural justice judgments.
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tions to our stimulus materials. As a first modification, in Exper-
iment 2 we added a third condition to the motor action manipula-
tion: a control condition in which participants were not exerting
any flexion or extension pressure. It was important to do so in
order to get an indication of whether arm flexion increases the
strength of participants’ reactions to procedures or, alternatively,
arm extension decreases the strength of participants’ reactions to
procedures. On the basis of our line of reasoning in the introduc-
tion, we expected that approach motor action (arm flexion) would
enhance the strength of the voice effect. After all, our line of
reasoning implies that approach motivation increases people’s
sensitivity to decision-making procedures.
As a second modification, we adjusted the motor action manip-
ulation: Participants either flexed or extended their arm muscles
for 5 min while simultaneously conducting tasks, ostensibly to
create an additional difficulty in participants’ task performance.
After these 5 min, participants stopped exerting flexion or exten-
sion pressure, before they encountered the procedure manipulation
or the dependent variables. We reasoned that if bodily feedback
produced by contraction of the flexion or extension muscles acti-
vates people’s approach versus avoidance tendencies, then these
tendencies should also be more accessible during the immediate
relaxation period. This delayed induction of the procedure manip-
ulation following the motor action manipulation should shed light
on the time span within which nonaffective bodily feedback pro-
duces effects on people’s reactions to decision-making procedures.
As a third modification to our stimulus materials, participants
directly experienced a voice or a no-voice procedure: Participants
were told that a number of lottery tickets would be divided among
all participants. They then received a message from the experi-
menter stating that they were either granted or denied voice about
the division of the lottery tickets. This manipulation of voice as
opposed to no-voice procedures has been frequently used in pro-
cedural justice research (e.g., Van den Bos, 2003; Van den Bos et
al., 1997, 1998; Van den Bos & Van Prooijen, 2001; Van Prooijen
et al., 2002). The main dependent variables were again procedural
justice judgments.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were assigned randomly to con-
ditions of a 3 (motor action: arm flexion vs. arm extension vs. control) 
2 (procedure: voice vs. no-voice) factorial design. A total of 118 partici-
pants (52 men and 66 women, age varying from 16 to 34 years) were
recruited in the restaurant of the Free University Amsterdam. The exper-
iment was followed by other, unrelated experiments. The experiments
lasted a total of 45 min, and participants, who took part voluntarily, were
paid 5 euros (U.S.$6.25).
Procedure. Participants were seated in the same cubicles and behind
the same computers as in Experiment 1. We then explained the experi-
mental procedure to the participants. The experiment was introduced as a
study on how people perform tasks. Participants were informed that they
would perform two rounds of tasks: a practice round of 2 min and a work
round of 5 min. Additionally, participants were led to believe that all
computers in the lab were interconnected and that the experimenter, who
was supposed to be in one of the cubicles, could send messages to all
participants during the experiment. (In reality, all stimulus information was
preprogrammed, a procedure none of the participants objected to upon
debriefing.) Finally, participants were informed that a lottery with a prize
of 50 euros would take place among all participants, and that following the
tasks the experimenter would allocate a number of lottery tickets to the
participant.
Next, the tasks were explained to the participants. Figures would be
presented on the upper right side of the computer screen. Each figure
consisted of 36 squares, and each square showed one of eight distinct
patterns. One of these patterns was presented at the upper left side of the
computer screen, and participants had to count the number of squares with
this pattern in the figure on the right side of the screen. After participants
had indicated the correct number, a new figure was presented. This pro-
cedure was repeated for 2 min in the practice round and for 5 min in the
work round. In each round, the time remaining was presented on the lower
left side of the computer screen, and the number of tasks completed (i.e.,
the number of figures the participant had counted during the round) was
presented in the lower right side of the computer screen.
After completing the practice round, we induced the motor action
manipulation. Participants in the arm flexion and extension conditions were
informed that they would face an additional difficulty in the work round:
Ostensibly to investigate how they would perform the tasks if they simul-
taneously exerted a slight physical effort, participants were asked to press
one of their hands against the table during the work round. In correspon-
dence with Experiment 1, in the arm flexion condition participants were
asked to put their palm under the table and press upward. In the arm
extension condition participants were asked to put their palm on the table
and press downward. In both conditions, participants were asked to main-
tain a slight pressure against the table during the entire work round and to
work through the tasks using their one free hand. In the control condition,
participants were not given the assignment to exert pressure against the
table. The control condition thus is similar to that used in previous
procedural justice experiments (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001, 2003; Van den
Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos et al., 1998; Van Prooijen et al.,
2002).
After the work round, all participants were informed that their score on
the tasks (in comparison with other participants) was about average.
Furthermore, participants in the arm flexion and extension conditions were
informed that they could stop exerting pressure against the table. We then
asked participants in the arm flexion and extension conditions how annoy-
ing and how physically strenuous it was to press their hand against the table
(1  not at all, 7  very much). Also, we asked participants to indicate
how they were pressing their arm against the table (1  pressing upward,
2 pressing downward, 3 not pressing) and whether they used their left
or right arm to press the table. Additionally, we asked participants in all
conditions how much physical effort it took to conduct the tasks and how
pressured they felt during the tasks (1  not at all, 7  very much).
The manipulation of procedure was then administered. Participants in
the voice condition were informed that they were allowed an opportunity
to voice their opinion about the number of lottery tickets that should be
allocated to them. These participants were asked to type in the number of
lottery tickets they thought they should receive. Participants in the no-voice
condition were informed that they were not allowed an opportunity to voice
their opinion about the number of lottery tickets that should be allocated to
them. These participants were not asked to type in the number of lottery
tickets they thought they should receive. Participants were then informed
that they would be asked a number of questions before being informed
about the number of lottery tickets they would receive. These questions
constituted the dependent measures and the manipulation checks.
To assess participants’ procedural justice judgments, we asked the
following three questions: “How correctly were you treated by the exper-
imenter?” (1  very incorrectly, 7  very correctly), “How dignified were
you treated by the experimenter?” (1  not very dignified, 7  very
dignified), and “How politely were you treated by the experimenter?” (1 
very impolitely, 7  very politely). These three items were averaged into a
reliable procedural justice scale (  .93). To check the procedure ma-
nipulation, we asked the following two questions (1  not at all, 7  very
much): “To what extent did the experimenter allow you an opportunity to
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voice your opinion about the number of lottery tickets that should be
allocated to you?” and “How much attention did the experimenter give to
your opinion about the number of lottery tickets that should be allocated to
you?” These two items were averaged into a reliable procedure check scale
(  .83). After this, participants were fully debriefed, thanked, and paid
for their participation.
Results
One male participant in the arm flexion condition indicated that
he was not pressing his arm against the table during the tasks. This
participant was excluded from further analyses, leaving 77 partic-
ipants in the motor action conditions and 40 in the control condi-
tion. In the motor action conditions, 70 participants indicated that
they used their left arm to press the table and 7 participants
indicated that they used their right arm to press the table. When
arm preference (left vs. right) was included as a dichotomous
covariate in the analyses comparing the procedure effect in the arm
flexion versus extension conditions, the results were similar to the
results without this covariate, described below. Unless noted ex-
plicitly, gender of the participants did not influence the variables
analyzed below and was excluded as a factor in the reported
analyses.
Manipulation check. A 3 2 ANOVA on the procedure check
scale showed a significant procedure main effect only, F(1, 111)
87.55, p  .001. Participants in the voice condition indicated
having received more opportunities to voice their opinions (M 
5.16, SD  1.45) than participants in the no-voice condition (M 
2.42, SD  1.66). These results showed that participants had
perceived the procedure manipulation as intended.
Physical discomfort of motor action. Given that the questions
concerning how annoying and how physically strenuous it was for
participants to press their hands against the table could be posed
only in the motor action conditions (i.e., arm flexion and exten-
sion), we analyzed these items with a 2  2 MANOVA. This
analysis did not show significant effects on either the multivariate
or the univariate level (for annoyance, overall M  4.66, SD 
1.59; for strenuousness, overall M  3.57, SD  1.51). When
included in the analyses, gender of the participant again influenced
physical strenuousness on the univariate level, F(1, 69)  5.54,
p  .03. In correspondence with Experiment 1, women found it
more physically strenuous to press their hand against the table
(M  3.91, SD  1.48) than men (M  3.12, SD  1.45).
However, this main effect was again nonsignificant on the multi-
variate level, and it was independent from the experimental ma-
nipulations. More important was that these results indicated that all
participants experienced an equal amount of physical discomfort
as a function of the motor action manipulation. Physical discom-
fort of motor action thus cannot explain the results reported here.
Pleasantness of the tasks. A 3  2 MANOVA on the ques-
tions concerning how much physical effort it took to conduct the
tasks and how pressured participants felt when conducting the
tasks revealed no significant effects on either the multivariate or
the univariate level (for physical effort, overall M  2.77, SD 
1.48; for pressure, overall M  3.42, SD  1.60). These results
indicated that participants in all conditions rated the tasks as
equally pleasant. Pleasantness of the tasks therefore cannot explain
the results described below.
Procedural justice judgments. The means and standard devi-
ations are displayed in Table 2. A 3  2 ANOVA on procedural
justice judgments revealed a significant procedure main effect,
F(1, 111)  162.42, p  .001. Participants who received a voice
procedure reported more positive procedural justice judgments
(M  5.29, SD  1.01) than participants who received a no-voice
procedure (M  2.72, SD  1.21). More important for the current
purposes was that the results also yielded the predicted interaction,
F(2, 111)  3.41, p  .04.
To more directly test our hypotheses, we conducted three inter-
action contrast analyses. First, we compared the procedure effect
in the arm flexion condition with the procedure effect in the arm
extension condition. This analysis showed a significant interaction
contrast, F(1, 111)  3.97, p  .05. Simple main effect analyses
revealed that the procedure manipulation exerted stronger effects
on procedural justice judgments in the arm flexion condition, F(1,
111)  87.39, p  .001, 2  .44, than in the arm extension
condition, F(1, 111)  45.81, p  .001, 2  .29. This result
corroborates our main hypothesis and replicates the findings of
Experiment 1. Second, we contrasted the procedure effect in the
arm flexion condition with the procedure effect in the control
condition. This interaction contrast also turned out to be signifi-
cant, F(1, 111)  6.10, p  .02. Simple main effect analyses
showed that the procedure simple main effect in the arm flexion
condition was also stronger than in the control condition, F(1,
111)  36.46, p  .001, 2  .25. These results extend the
findings obtained in Experiment 1 by revealing that approach
motor action (i.e., arm flexion) enhances people’s reactions to
voice versus no-voice procedures relative to a control condition.
Third, we contrasted the procedure effect in the arm extension
condition with the procedure effect in the control condition. This
interaction contrast was nonsignificant (F  1).
As an aside, we note that the motor action simple main effect
was nonsignificant in the voice condition (F 1) but significant in
the no-voice condition, F(2, 111)  4.50, p  .02. This finding
reflects one of the possible consequences of approach motivation.
After all, approach motivation can produce either positive or
negative reactions as a result of obtaining versus not obtaining
positive stimuli (Higgins, 1997). However, this finding is incon-
sistent with Experiment 1, in which the motor action manipulation
influenced reactions to voice instead of no-voice; we address this
issue in the General Discussion.
Discussion
In correspondence with Experiment 1, Experiment 2 revealed
that people respond more strongly to voice as opposed to no-voice
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Procedural
Justice Judgments as a Function of Motor Action and Procedure
(Experiment 2)
Procedure
Motor action
Arm flexion Arm extension Control
M SD M SD M SD
Voice 5.47 1.09 5.22 1.00 5.20 0.98
No-voice 2.15 0.84 2.90 1.14 3.12 1.42
Note. Higher means indicate more positive procedural justice judgments.
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procedures when they flex their arms than when they extend their
arms. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 indicate that this
difference between motor action conditions is attributable to an
increased impact of the procedure manipulation in the arm flexion
condition, not to a decreased impact of the procedure manipulation
in the arm extension condition. After all, whereas the relative
strength of the voice effect did not differ between the arm exten-
sion and control conditions, the arm flexion condition produced a
significantly stronger voice effect than the control condition. These
findings are supportive for the idea that approach motor action
amplifies people’s fairness-based reactions to decision-making
procedures.
Experiments 1 and 2 focused on a specific and situational
operationalization of approach and avoidance motivation through a
manipulation of motor action. Although previous research has
established clear indications that this motor action manipulation
indeed reflects the hedonic principle (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Fo¨r-
ster, 2003; Friedman & Fo¨rster, 2000, 2002), we believe that it is
important to replicate the current results with a different opera-
tionalization of approach versus avoidance motivation. To get an
indication of the generality of our findings and to increase our
confidence that the hedonic principle provides an appropriate
theoretical framework for the present findings, in Experiment 3 we
measured participants’ chronic approach and avoidance motiva-
tions as individual-difference variables. We investigated the rela-
tion of these measures with a subsequent manipulation of voice
versus no-voice procedures.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we first measured Carver and White’s (1994)
Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS) and Behavioral Inhibition
Scale (BIS). These scales are designed to measure people’s ap-
proach versus avoidance motivational orientations as individual-
difference variables. In the case of behavioral activation (BAS),
we specifically focused on Carver and White’s Reward Respon-
siveness scale, which is designed to measure people’s approach
responses to the occurrence or anticipation of rewarding events.
This BAS scale most closely fits our theoretical line of reasoning,
which has focused on the idea that people expect procedures to be
rewarding because the procedures may imply the acquisition of
instrumental gains or positive self-relevant social information
(Tyler & Lind, 1992).1 After the measurement of participants’
approach and avoidance motivations, participants were informed
that they would conduct another, ostensibly unrelated study. In this
second study we manipulated voice versus no-voice procedures in
the same way as we did in Experiment 2. The main dependent
variables consisted of participants’ procedural justice judgments
(Tyler & Lind, 1992). On the basis of our line of reasoning in the
introduction, and the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, we pre-
dicted that people’s approach motivations (and not their avoidance
motivations) would moderate procedural justice judgments as a
function of voice as opposed to no-voice procedures. Specifically,
we expected that the voice effect would be stronger among those
high in behavioral activation than among those low in behavioral
activation.
Method
Participants and design. We tested our hypothesis in a design in which
we measured participants’ approach and avoidance tendencies as continu-
ous independent variables and manipulated procedure by randomly assign-
ing participants to voice and no-voice conditions. Participants were 113
Leiden University students (42 men and 71 women, varying in age from 17
to 31 years). The experiment was preceded by another, unrelated experi-
ment. The experiments lasted a total of 1 hr. Participants voluntarily
engaged in the experiments and were paid 7 euros (U.S.$8.75).
Procedure. On arrival at the laboratory, participants were led to sep-
arate cubicles. The cubicles contained computer equipment that was used
to present the stimulus information and to register the data. The experiment
was presented as two separate studies. Participants started with “Study 1,”
which was presented as a study on “life experiences.” The study consisted
of a series of questionnaires with 7-point scales. Among these question-
naires was Carver and White’s (1994) BIS, a seven-item scale designed to
measure participants’ avoidance responses to the occurrence or anticipation
of undesirable events (example item: “I worry about making mistakes”;
  .81). Also included was Carver and White’s (1994) five-item Reward
Responsiveness scale of the BAS. This scale is designed to measure
people’s approach responses to the occurrence or anticipation of rewarding
events (example item: “When I see an opportunity for something I like, I
get excited right away”;   .78). In correspondence with Carver and
White’s validation study, the BIS and BAS scales were positively corre-
lated (r  .19, p  .05).
The first study then ended, and participants continued with “Study 2.” In
correspondence with Experiment 2, this study was presented as a study on
how people conduct tasks. Furthermore, participants were informed that
the experimenter could send messages to the participants using the com-
puter network and additionally that a lottery would take place among all
participants. The winner of the lottery would receive a prize of 50 euros. A
total of 200 lottery tickets would be divided among all participants, and
some of these lottery tickets would be allocated to the participant.
Participants then started with the tasks. The tasks consisted of the
counting of squares in the same way as in Experiment 2 (Van den Bos et
al., 1997, 1998; Van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos & Van
Prooijen, 2001; Van Prooijen et al., 2002, 2004a). However, in this exper-
iment, participants would conduct a total of 25 tasks, without the time
constraint that we used in Experiment 2. Participants were asked to
complete all 25 tasks.
Following the tasks, we manipulated procedure. This manipulation was
the same as in Experiment 2. After the procedure manipulation, partici-
pants were again informed that they would first be asked some questions
before being informed about the number of lottery tickets they would
receive. These questions constituted the dependent measures and the ma-
nipulation checks. To measure procedural justice judgments, we asked the
following questions: “How correctly were you treated by the experi-
menter?” (1  very incorrectly, 7  very correctly), “How respectfully
were you treated by the experimenter?” (1 very disrespectfully, 7 very
respectfully), “How politely were you treated by the experimenter?” (1 
very impolitely, 7  very politely), and “To what extent do you respect the
experimenter?” (1  not at all, 7  very much). Confirmatory factor
analysis revealed an excellent fit of a one-factor model comprising these
four items, 2(2, N  113)  2.27, ns; normed fit index  .99; nonnormed
1 Carver and White (1994) identified one BIS scale and three BAS
scales. The two other BAS scales are the Drive scale, which measures
people’s persistence when pursuing desirable goals, and the Fun Seeking
scale, which measures people’s tendencies to approach new and exciting
situations on the spur of the moment. Given that these two scales have a
much poorer fit to our theoretical argument than the Reward Responsive-
ness scale, the Drive and Fun Seeking scales were ignored in the current
research.
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fit index  1.00; comparative fit index  1.00. We therefore averaged
these items into a reliable procedural justice scale (  .85). To check the
procedure manipulation, we asked the same two questions as in Experiment
2, which were again averaged into a reliable procedure check scale ( 
.78). The experiment then ended, and participants were debriefed, paid, and
thanked for their participation.
Results
The results were analyzed with linear regression analyses that
specified as independent variables the main effects (the BIS scale,
the BAS scale, and the procedure manipulation), the two-way
interactions (BIS  Procedure, BAS  Procedure, and BIS 
BAS), and the three-way interaction (BIS  BAS  Procedure).
Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken’s (2003) recommen-
dations, we centered participants’ answers on the BIS and BAS
scales and effect-coded the procedure manipulation (1 and 1).
The interaction terms were based on the products of the centered
BIS and BAS scales and the effect-coded procedure manipulation.2
When included as an independent variable in the regression
analyses, gender did not show any main effects or interactions with
the other independent variables on the manipulation check or the
dependent variable. We therefore dropped gender in the statistical
analyses reported here.
Manipulation check. A regression analysis on the procedure
check scale indicated that the regression equation accounted for a
significant amount of variance (R2  .48), F(7, 105)  13.82, p 
.001. Participants’ answers on the procedure check scale were
predicted by the procedure main effect only (  .70, p  .001).
Participants in the voice condition perceived more opportunities to
voice their opinions (M 4.67, SD 1.37) than participants in the
no-voice condition (M  2.11, SD  1.47). From these analyses
we conclude that participants perceived the procedure manipula-
tion as intended.
Procedural justice judgments. The results of the regression
analysis on procedural justice judgments are displayed in Table 3.
The regression equation accounted for a significant amount of
variance on procedural justice judgments (R2  .16), F(7, 105) 
2.79, p  .02. As displayed in Table 3, participants’ procedural
justice judgments were predicted by the procedure manipulation
(  .32, p  .01). More important, the results also yielded a
significant BAS  Procedure interaction term (  .19, p  .05).
To further explore this interaction term, we conducted simple
slopes analyses (Cohen et al., 2003). Among those high in ap-
proach motivation, voice as opposed to no-voice procedures pos-
itively influenced procedural justice judgments (  .41, p 
.001), whereas among those low in approach motivation, voice as
opposed to no-voice procedures did not influence procedural jus-
tice judgments (  .13, p 	 .42). The BAS  Procedure inter-
action is illustrated in Figure 1. These results indicate that, as
predicted, the procedure manipulation exerted stronger effects on
participants’ procedural justice judgments among those high in
approach motivation than among those low in approach
motivation.
Further, the BAS did not predict procedural justice judgments in
the voice condition (  .10, p 	 .45) but did predict procedural
justice judgments in the no-voice condition (  .28, p  .04).
These latter results, which are consistent with the findings obtained
in Experiment 2, are revisited in the General Discussion.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 extend the results obtained in
Experiments 1 and 2 in two ways. First, the finding that people’s
approach motivations (and not their avoidance motivations) mod-
erated the effects of voice as opposed to no-voice procedures
further corroborates the idea that procedural justice judgments are
shaped by people’s approach motivations and less so by their
avoidance motivations. These findings are in correspondence with
the findings obtained in Experiment 2, which indicated that ap-
proach motor action enhanced the voice effect relative to a control
condition. Second, the findings in Experiment 3 increase the
plausibility of the assumption that the motor action manipulation
of Experiments 1 and 2 activated participants’ motivational orien-
tations (cf. Cacioppo et al., 1993) and that it was these motiva-
tional orientations that influenced people’s reactions to decision-
making procedures. After all, the findings of Experiment 3, in
which we directly measured participants’ motivational orienta-
tions, are consistent with the effects of motor action in Experi-
ments 1 and 2. Together with the previous experiments, Experi-
ment 3 has further revealed evidence that people’s procedural
justice judgments are influenced profoundly by their motivational
orientations.
General Discussion
The three experiments presented here provide empirical evi-
dence for the proposition that people’s motivational orientations
(approach vs. avoidance) influences the voice effect. The results of
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that arm flexion, a motor reflex that
is associated with approach motivation (Cacioppo et al., 1993;
Fo¨rster, 2003), leads to stronger voice effects than arm extension,
a motor reflex that is associated with avoidance motivation. These
2 Given that our main prediction was a lower order interaction (i.e., a
two-way interaction in the presence of a three-way interaction), it was in
this case particularly important to center the BIS and BAS scales. As
emphasized by Cohen et al. (2003, p. 261), the interpretation of lower order
coefficients in linear regression is meaningful only if all main effects and
interactions are based on centered predictors. After centering our predic-
tors, the reported linear regression analyses produced the same beta
weights as hierarchical regression analyses.
Table 3
Results From Regression Analyses: Procedural Justice
Judgments as a Function of the Behavioral Inhibition Scale
(BIS), the Behavioral Activation Scale (BAS), and Procedure
(Experiment 3)
Predictor  t (105)
Procedure .32 3.49**
BIS .09 0.94
BAS .11 1.15
BIS  Procedure .01 0.07
BAS  Procedure .19 2.06*
BIS  BAS .02 0.19
BIS  BAS  Procedure .03 0.33
* p  .05. ** p  .01.
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findings were extended in a third experiment in which we mea-
sured people’s approach and avoidance motivational orientations
as individual-difference variables (Carver & White, 1994). The
findings of Experiment 3 were in correspondence with Experi-
ments 1 and 2 by revealing that people high in approach motiva-
tion displayed stronger reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice
procedures than people low in approach motivation. Furthermore,
people’s avoidance motivations turned out to be unrelated to the
effects of voice versus no-voice procedures on procedural justice
judgments. Taken together, the results of these experiments clearly
suggest that voice effects are shaped by people’s approach moti-
vations, and less so by their avoidance motivations.
Although these effects were found in three experiments, we note
that approach motivation stimulated reactions to voice procedures
in Experiment 1 and reactions to no-voice procedures in Experi-
ments 2 and 3. These differential effects may reflect two possible
approach-motivated reactions (Higgins, 1997): People may re-
spond positively to obtaining pleasure (as implied by voice pro-
cedures) or negatively to being denied pleasure (as implied by
no-voice procedures). (Likewise, Higgins noted that people’s
avoidance motivations can also be reflected both by positive
reactions to avoiding pain and by negative reactions to not avoid-
ing pain.) The findings in Experiments 2 and 3 were in correspon-
dence with previous notions that people’s negative responses to
injustice usually are stronger than their positive responses to
justice (Folger, 1984; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke,
2006). It may therefore be the case that reactions to no-voice
procedures in particular are sensitive to people’s motivational
orientations. However, whereas in Experiments 2 and 3 partici-
pants were not fully informed about their outcomes, in the scenario
of Experiment 1 participants received full disclosure of the posi-
tive outcomes of voice. This explicit outcome information might
have caused approach motivation to stimulate people’s responses
to voice instead of no-voice procedures. These explanations are
speculative, and future research might explore under what condi-
tions motivational orientations influence reactions to voice or
no-voice procedures. For now, it seems safe to conclude that
people’s motivational orientations have the potential to influence
reactions to both voice and no-voice procedures. More important
for the current purposes is the finding that people’s approach
motivations yielded stronger reactions to voice versus no-voice
procedures than people’s avoidance motivations, a finding that was
replicated in three experiments.
The main theoretical contribution of the current research is that
it has increased insights into the motivational nature of the voice
effect. We have made explicit that theoretical perspectives on
procedural justice have assumed that people’s approach motiva-
tions stimulate their fairness-based responses to voice and no-
voice procedures (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker,
1975; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). In correspon-
dence with this assumption, our results suggest that participants’
procedural justice judgments were predominantly associated with
the chronic or situational accessibility of their approach motiva-
tions. This conclusion has implications for both fundamental and
applied social justice research. After all, people are subjected to
voice or no-voice procedures in numerous social settings, such as
organizations, legal settings, schools, and other settings that in-
volve interactions with decision-making authorities (Lind & Tyler,
1988). In such social situations, knowing whether people react out
of approach or avoidance motivation might influence how to
assuage their negative reactions when they are denied voice or
when providing voice is impossible. Furthermore, understanding
the motivational nature of voice effects may increase scientists’
ability to predict people’s reactions to voice or no-voice proce-
dures in these social situations. These practical implications need
to be tested further, of course, and it would be premature to draw
firm conclusions regarding the real-life implications of the current
findings. Although the findings presented here may not be in-
stantly applicable to all possible types of social situations—as
usually is the case in experimental research—the conclusions that
we draw here extend existing procedural justice theories (Thibaut
& Walker, 1975; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and may therefore provide
a more solid theoretical base for both fundamental and applied
research.
It is important to note that the current findings do not imply that
people’s reactions to procedures necessarily are always approach
motivated (cf. Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003). Notably, a
constraint of our experiments was that participants received voice
versus no-voice procedures about decisions that involved gains
instead of losses (i.e., a financial bonus in Experiment 1 and lottery
tickets in Experiments 2 and 3). As noted in the introduction, this
focus on gains is in correspondence both with many real-life
decisions involving positive outcomes and with a substantial num-
ber of previous procedural justice studies. We therefore decided
that a focus on gain-framed decisions would be a good starting
point to explore the underlying motivational principles of voice
effects. Having said this, we note that in everyday life, loss
decisions do also happen of course, and it is noteworthy that some
procedural justice research has explicitly focused on loss deci-
sions. For example, Brockner and his colleagues have studied
procedural justice effects in the context of job layoff decisions
(e.g., Brockner et al., 1994, 1998). It would be interesting to
investigate how approach versus avoidance motivation influences
the voice effect in these loss-oriented situations.
More specifically, it might be expected that a gain–loss distinc-
tion moderates the influence of motivational orientations on
fairness-based reactions to voice procedures. Such a prediction
would be consistent with regulatory focus theory, which has pos-
ited that the hedonic principle operates differently when serving
different human needs (Higgins, 1997, 2000; see also Camacho et
al., 2003; Fo¨rster et al., 1998; Lee & Aaker, 2004). According to
this theory, people’s desired end state in a gain-framed context
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Figure 1. Procedural justice judgments as a function of the Behavioral
Activation Scale (BAS) and procedure.
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entails accomplishments (i.e., a promotion focus), and to achieve
this end state, people strategically approach and avoid gains versus
nongains. Given the focus on gains, however, approach motivation
is the dominant tendency because it provides a better fit to people’s
regulatory orientation than avoidance motivation. In a loss-framed
context, people’s desired end state entails security (i.e., a preven-
tion focus), and to achieve this end state, people strategically
approach and avoid losses versus nonlosses. Given the focus on
losses, however, avoidance motivation provides the better fit to
people’s regulatory orientation. Extrapolating this theoretical
framework to the procedural justice field, it may be expected that
when people are confronted with voice or no-voice procedures in
loss-framed situations (e.g., when material losses are at stake, or
social losses such as when people are threatened to be excluded
from valuable social groups), their fairness-based reactions may be
stimulated by their avoidance motivations instead of their ap-
proach motivations. These ideas are beyond the scope of the
current article but do constitute a challenging opportunity for
future research. It is important to keep in mind that the current
research was not focused on differential effects of gains versus
losses but on the possibility that the hedonic principle constitutes
an important motivational dimension to understand people’s pro-
cedural justice judgments.
Another issue that we would like to raise is that we focused
exclusively on voice versus no-voice procedures and not on other
elements of procedural justice, such as procedural accuracy or
consistency between persons (e.g., Leventhal, 1980). Voice versus
no-voice procedures strongly influence procedural justice judg-
ments and constitute the basis for influential procedural justice
theories (Brockner et al., 1998; Folger, 1977; Lind & Tyler, 1988;
Tyler & Lind, 1992; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos et al., 1998).
However, voice is also distinct from other elements of procedural
justice because it has more of an agentic quality to it: In the case
of voice procedures, procedural justice judgments partially depend
on actions of the recipient, that is, their willingness and ability to
provide input in the decision-making process. In contrast, most
other elements of procedural justice almost exclusively refer to
actions on the part of the decision maker rather than actions by the
recipient. This active role of the recipient, which differentiates
voice from other elements of procedural justice, may be psycho-
logically associated with people’s approach motivations. This line
of reasoning is speculative and leads to the empirical question of
whether the current findings would generalize to other elements of
procedural justice, such as accurate versus inaccurate procedures.
Be that as it may, for now one can conclude that motivational
orientations have a profound influence on fairness-based reactions
to voice and no-voice procedures, and these procedures are a key
factor in the psychology of procedural justice.
Given that hedonic motivation precedes the hedonic states of
pleasure and pain, it might be reasoned that the current findings are
related to mood. We suspect that the current findings cannot be
explained by variations in mood, for at least two reasons. First,
previous research has indicated that the motor action manipulation
does not influence mood (Cacioppo et al., 1993). This finding is
consistent with the assumption that the motor action manipulation
induces approach and avoidance motivation: After all, both ap-
proach and avoidance motivation can elicit positive and negative
moods, depending on how successful people are in approaching
pleasure or avoiding pain. Second, previous research has explicitly
investigated the influence of mood on reactions to voice and
no-voice procedures (Van den Bos, 2003), and the results were
different from the current findings. Van den Bos (2003) found that
mood influenced procedural fairness judgments only if people did
not have information concerning what decision-making procedures
were adopted by authorities. In the current experiments, however,
all participants received explicit information about the procedures
used (voice or no-voice), yet motor action moderated the voice
effect in predictable ways. Taken together, the current findings are
more likely explained by hedonic motivation (approach vs. avoid-
ance) rather than by the valence of specific hedonic states (positive
vs. negative).
The main ideas of the current article were inspired by both
instrumental and noninstrumental perspectives of procedural jus-
tice effects. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the present
studies were not intended as direct tests of either of these perspec-
tives, nor did we intend to show that both outcomes and relational
concerns explain the relation between the hedonic principle and
procedural justice judgments. After all, our experimental designs
did not incorporate manipulations of outcomes or of interpersonal
relatedness. Rather, we have assumed that the hedonic principle
constitutes a basic phenomenon that describes the motivational
process of how people seek to fulfill their instrumental and rela-
tional needs. These instrumental and relational needs are typical
procedural-justice-related concerns (Lind & Tyler, 1988), leading
us to reason that the hedonic principle is a predictor of procedural
justice judgments. Given that the results were supportive for this
idea, the current research may provide a starting point to more
directly explore the processes that form the motivational under-
pinnings of people’s strivings for fair outcome distributions and
respectful interpersonal treatment.
To conclude, we have tried to reveal here that the hedonic
principle is related to people’s fairness-based reactions to decision-
making procedures. Evidence for this idea was found by investi-
gating the effects of physiological feedback produced by approach
versus avoidance muscle stimulations (Experiments 1 and 2) and
individual-difference measures of behavioral activation and behav-
ioral inhibition (Experiment 3) on reactions to procedures. These
three studies have led to the conclusion that people are particularly
sensitive to common conceptualizations of voice versus no-voice
procedures when they are approach motivated. As such, one can
conclude that the hedonic principle is an important principle in the
psychology of procedural justice.
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